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1 Introduction
In the current U.S. tax code different types of capital are taxed at different rates effectively.1
Recently, President Obama’s administration has proposed to eliminate these differentials in a
budget neutral way.2 This paper analyzes the aggregate and distributional consequences of
such a reform using an incomplete markets model with two types of capital and equipment-skill
complementarity. We find that this reform creates economy-wide productive efficiency gains
by reallocating capital from low to high return capital. In addition, by decreasing the skill
premium, eliminating capital tax differentials redistributes from the rich to the poor. Therefore,
the reform does not suffer from the usual efficiency vs. equality trade-off: it improves both.
Specifically, we build an infinite horizon model with heterogeneous agents with the following
features. First, agents are either skilled or unskilled, and the skill type is permanent. Second,
both skilled and unskilled agents are subject to idiosyncratic labor productivity shocks. Third,
there are two types of capital, structure capital and equipment capital, and the production
function features a higher degree of complementarity between equipment capital and skilled
labor than between equipment capital and unskilled labor, as documented empirically for the
U.S. economy by Krusell, Ohanian, R´ıos-Rull, and Violante (2000).3 Finally, the government
uses linear taxes on capital income and consumption and a non-linear labor income tax schedule
to finance government consumption and repay debt. We solve for the stationary competitive
equilibrium of this model and calibrate the model parameters to the U.S. economy. The main
objective of the paper is to use the calibrated model to evaluate the long-run effects of a uniform
capital tax reform, which equalizes the tax rates on the two types of capital while keeping the
rest of the fiscal policies intact.
Gravelle (2011) estimates that the U.S. effective corporate tax rate on equipment capital is
26% and that on structure capital is 32%.4 Combining the 15% flat capital income tax rate that
consumers face with the differential capital tax rates at the corporate level, the overall effective
tax rate on equipment capital is 37.1% while the overall effective tax rate on structure capital
is 42.2%. We find that in our model a budget neutral tax reform that eliminates capital tax
differentials equates the tax rates on both types of capital at 39.66%.
This uniform tax reform has two effects on the economy. First, it improves productive
1Bilicka and Devereux (2012) document differences in effective tax rates across different types of capital assets
for a large set of countries including major European countries such as Germany, France, Italy and the U.K.
2See the 2011 U.S. President’s State of the Union Address at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2011/01/25/remarks-president-state-union-address. For more details, see also the President’s Frame-
work for Business Tax Reform (2012).
3Flug and Hercowitz (2000) provide evidence for equipment-skill complementarity for a large set of countries.
4Effective tax rates across capital types differ because of differences between tax depreciation allowances and
actual economic depreciation rates. For more details, see Gravelle (1994).
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efficiency by reallocating a given capital stock more efficiently between the two types of capital.
Intuitively, by taxing structure capital at a higher rate than equipment capital, the current tax
code distorts firms’ capital decisions in favor of using more equipment capital. As a result, the
marginal return to equipment capital is lower than the marginal return to structure capital under
the current tax system. By eliminating the tax differentials, the proposed reform eliminates this
distortion through capital reallocation from the capital type with lower returns, equipment
capital, to the capital type with higher returns, structure capital. This way capital reallocation
brings the economy closer to its production possibilities frontier. Second, due to equipment-
skill complementarity, a lower level of equipment capital in the new steady state decreases the
skill premium, indirectly redistributing from the skilled to the unskilled. This implies a more
egalitarian distribution of resources between skilled and unskilled agents (a decline in ‘between-
group’ inequality). We conclude that the proposed reform does not involve the usual equality
vs. efficiency trade-off: eliminating capital tax differentials not only increases efficiency, but also
improves equality.
Next, we measure the steady-state welfare consequences of the uniform capital tax reform.
We first consider a Utilitarian social welfare function that puts equal weights on all agents.
Using this measure, we find that the overall steady-state welfare gains of the reform are 0.09%
in terms of lifetime consumption. We also compute the welfare gains for skilled and unskilled
agents separately. We find that on average the unskilled agents’ welfare increases by 0.15%
whereas the skilled agents’ welfare decreases by less than 0.01%. We interpret these findings as
follows. By increasing productive efficiency, the reform increases average welfare for both types
of agents. Through indirect redistribution, the reform increases welfare of unskilled agents and
decreases welfare of skilled agents. It turns out that, in our benchmark model, the efficiency
gains and redistribution losses almost fully offset each other for the skilled agents, resulting in
a small welfare loss. For the unskilled agents, the redistributive gains plus the efficiency gains
sum up to a significant welfare gain.
The government could also accompany the capital tax reform by a modification of the labor
tax code in order to distribute the efficiency gains across agents in a different way. In particular,
the government could distribute a larger share of the efficiency gains to the skilled agents to
ensure that they are not worse off. The important point is that the uniform capital tax reform
makes it possible to increase the average steady state welfare of one type of agents without
decreasing it for the other type. An example of such a reform is provided in Section 4.3.
In this paper, we compare welfare across steady states. In an environment similar to ours,
Domeij and Heathcote (2004) shows that a government that ignores short-run welfare finds it
optimal to choose very low capital tax rates in order to encourage long-run capital accumulation,
and that such a reform has dire welfare consequences in the short-run. Our reform does not
3
suffer as much from this critique, because average capital taxes are almost unaffected by the
tax reform, and there is only a small, 0.4%, increase in the aggregate capital stock from the
initial to the new steady state. To check the validity of this argument, we analyze another
tax reform, in which the uniform capital tax is set so that the aggregate capital stock remains
unchanged across steady states. This requires uniform capital taxes to be slightly higher than
in the benchmark reform. We find that the welfare gains of this reform are over two thirds of
the benchmark welfare gains, validating our argument.
We also conduct a number of robustness checks and find that the main quantitative conclu-
sions are robust to alternative preference specifications, the degree of labor tax progressivity,
and the degree of idiosyncratic wage risk. Assuming that the United States is an open economy
that faces a fixed world interest rate does not change the main results substantially either. As
expected, the reform is more redistributive when we assume a higher degree of equipment-skill
complementarity.
In all our quantitative exercises, we find that the uniform capital tax reform improves pro-
ductive efficiency. In Section 5, we analytically show that, under our parametric specification
of the labor disutility function, productive efficiency indeed calls for taxing capital uniformly.
We solve a Ramsey problem for a version of our economy with a representative agent - and
hence, without redistribution and insurance concerns - and find that it is optimal to tax capital
uniformly. This result suggests that a reform towards equalizing capital taxes should improve
productive efficiency, thereby providing a theoretical justification for our quantitative findings.5
We also show that if the government has a redistributive goal, then it might be optimal to tax
equipments at a higher rate than structures. This result suggests that a reform from the status
quo, in which equipments are taxed at a lower rate than structures, towards uniform capital
taxation should improve equality, which is indeed what we find in the quantitative analysis.
Related Literature. This paper is related to a set of papers that evaluate the consequences
of eliminating capital tax differentials. The closest to this paper is Auerbach (1989), who
computes the welfare gains associated with eliminating the capital tax differentials that existed
prior to the U.S. Tax Reform Act of 1986. Because he is not interested in the distributional
consequences of his reform, he uses a model without heterogeneity. Modeling heterogeneity
is crucial for our paper, however, because our main message is that a uniform capital tax
reform improves not only efficiency, but also equality. Auerbach (1983) and Gravelle (1994)
both compute the deadweight loss of misallocation of capital that is created by differential
5Some authors have argued that investment in equipment capital might create positive externalities. Under
that assumption, efficiency would call for taxing equipments at a lower rate than structures. Thus, a reform that
increases equipment capital taxes and decreases structure capital taxes would be bad for efficiency. Auerbach,
Hassett, and Oliner (1994) point out, however, that it is hard to support the existence of such positive externalities
on empirical grounds. The current paper abstracts from externalities.
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taxation of capital and find losses that are in the range of 0.10 to 0.15 % of U.S. GNP assuming
Cobb-Douglas production technologies. Recently, Gravelle (2011) evaluates the implications of
reforming the tax depreciation rules present in the U.S. tax code for the effective tax rates
on different types of capital and for the corporate tax revenues. Unlike our paper, she is not
interested in the economy-wide implications and the welfare consequences of her reform.
There is a related literature that analyzes optimal capital tax policy in environments with
multiple types of capital. The productive efficiency result of Diamond and Mirrlees (1971)
implies that, in an environment with multiple capital types, all capital should be taxed at the
same rate. Auerbach (1979) shows that in an overlapping generations environment it might be
optimal to tax capital differentially if the government is exogenously restricted to a narrower set
of fiscal instruments than in Diamond and Mirrlees (1971). Similarly, Feldstein (1990) proves the
optimality of differential capital taxation in a static model in which the government is restricted
to set the tax rate on one type of capital equal to zero. Slav´ık and Yazici (2014) shows that a
government that has redistribution and incentive provision goals generically finds it optimal to
tax capital differentially if the production technology features equipment-skill complementarity.
Conesa and Dominguez (2013) considers an economy with tangible and intangible capital where
capital is taxed twice: first, through a corporate income tax, and second, at the consumer level,
through a dividend tax. They find that the optimal long-run policy features zero corporate
taxes and positive dividend taxes. These papers are normative, whereas the current paper is
a positive analysis of the aggregate and distributional consequences of the uniform capital tax
reform recently proposed by the Obama administration.
Finally, this paper is related to a growing literature, which analyzes the quantitative effects
of tax reforms using incomplete markets models with heterogeneous agents, such as Domeij
and Heathcote (2004), Conesa and Krueger (2006), Conesa, Kitao, and Krueger (2009) and
Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2012), among others. Our paper is most closely related
to Domeij and Heathcote (2004) in the sense that both papers provide positive analyses of
capital tax reforms. While Domeij and Heathcote (2004) focuses on the consequences of capital
tax cuts, we analyze an environment with multiple capital and focus on a policy reform which
(by equalizing capital tax rates) changes the mix between equipment and structure capital
taxation, but leaves the overall level of capital taxation virtually unaffected. We believe that
understanding the consequences of the uniform capital tax reform is very relevant given the
current policy debates fueled by the Obama proposal. Methodologically, we contribute to this
literature by analyzing tax reforms in an environment with equipment-skill complementarity.
Modelling equipment-skill complementarity is important as it allows us to take into account the
effect of the tax reform on the wage distribution.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we lay out the model. Section 3
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discusses calibration. Section 4 provides our main quantitative findings and Section 5 provides
theoretical insights for the quantitative results by analyzing Ramsey optimal tax problems.
Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Model
We consider an infinite horizon growth model with two types of capital (structures and equip-
ments), two types of labor (skilled and unskilled), consumers, firms, and a government.
Endowments and Preferences. There is a continuum of measure one of agents who live
for infinitely many periods. In each period, they are endowed with one unit of time. Ex-ante,
they differ in their skill levels: they are born either skilled or unskilled, i ∈ {u, s}. Skilled
agents can only work in the skilled labor sector and unskilled agents only in the unskilled labor
sector. The skill types are permanent. The total mass of the skilled agents is denoted by pis,
the total mass of the unskilled agents is denoted by piu. In the quantitative analysis, skill types
correspond to educational attainment at the time of entering the labor market. Agents who
have college education or above are classified as skilled agents and the rest of the agents are
classified as unskilled agents.
In addition to heterogeneity between skill groups, we model heterogeneity within each skill
group by assuming that agents face idiosyncratic labor productivity shocks over time. The pro-
ductivity shock, denoted by z, follows a type-specific Markov chain with states Zi = {zi,1, ..., zi,I}
and transitions Πi(z
′|z). An agent of skill type i and productivity level z who works l units of
time produces l · z units of effective i type of labor. As a result, her wage per unit of time is
wi · z, where wi is the wage per effective unit of labor in sector i. The modeling of productivity
shocks, and hence within-group inequality, is important as it allows us to analyze the effects of
uniform capital tax reform on within-group inequality.
Preferences over sequences of consumption and labor, (ci,t, li,t)
∞
t=0, are defined using a sepa-
rable utility function
Ei
( ∞∑
t=0
βtiu(ci,t)− v(li,t)
)
,
where βi is the time discount factor which is allowed to be different across skill types.
6 For
each skill type, unconditional expectation, Ei, is taken with respect to the stochastic processes
governing the idiosyncratic labor shock. There are no aggregate shocks.
6Attanasio, Banks, Meghir, and Weber (1999) provide empirical evidence for differences in discount factors
across education groups. In our quantitative analysis, we calibrate the discount factors so as to match the
observed difference in wealth between skilled and unskilled agents. We perform a version of our benchmark
quantitative exercise in which we assume that the discount factors are equal for the two types of agents. As we
report in Section 4.5, our main quantitative results are robust to this modification.
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Technology. There is a constant returns to scale production function: Y = F (Ks, Ke, Ls, Lu),
where Ks and Ke refer to aggregate structure capital and equipment capital and Ls and Lu refer
to aggregate effective skilled and unskilled labor, respectively. We also define a function F˜ that
gives the total wealth of the economy: F˜ = F + (1 − δs)Ks + (1 − δe)Ke, where δs and δe are
the depreciation rates of structure and equipment capital, respectively.
The key feature of the technology is equipment-skill complementarity, which means that
the degree of complementarity between equipment capital and skilled labor is higher than that
between equipment capital and unskilled labor. This implies that an increase in the stock of
equipment capital decreases the ratio of the marginal product of unskilled labor to the marginal
product of skilled labor. In a world with competitive factor markets, this implies that the skill
premium, defined as the ratio of skilled to unskilled wages, is increasing in equipment capital.
Structure capital, on the other hand, is assumed to be neutral in terms of its complementarity
with skilled and unskilled labor. These assumptions on technology are in line with the empirical
evidence provided by Krusell, Ohanian, Rı´os-Rull, and Violante (2000). Letting ∂F/∂m be the
partial derivative of function F with respect to variable m, we formalize these assumptions as
follows.
Assumption 1. ∂F/∂Ls
∂F/∂Lu
is independent of Ks.
Assumption 2. ∂F/∂Ls
∂F/∂Lu
is strictly increasing in Ke.
There is a representative firm which, in each period, hires the two types of labor and rents
the two types of capital to maximize profits. In any period t, its maximization problem reads:
max
Ks,t,Ke,t,Ls,t,Lu,t
F (Ks,t, Ke,t, Ls,t, Lu,t)− rs,tKs,t − re,tKe,t − ws,tLs,t − wu,tLu,t,
where rs,t and re,t are the rental rates of structure and equipment capital, and wu,t and ws,t are
the wages rates paid to unskilled and skilled effective labor in period t.
Asset Market Structure. There is a single risk free asset which has a one period maturity.
Consumers can save using this asset but are not allowed to borrow. Every period total savings
by consumers must be equal to total borrowing of the government plus the total capital stock
in the economy.
Government. The government uses linear consumption taxes every period {τ c,t}∞t=0 and
linear taxes on capital income net of depreciation. The tax rates on the two types of capital are
allowed to be different. Let {τ s,t}∞t=0 and {τ e,t}∞t=0 be the sequences of tax rates on structure
and equipment capital. It is irrelevant for our analysis whether capital income is taxed at the
consumer or at the corporate level. We assume without loss of generality that all capital income
taxes are paid at the consumer level. The government taxes labor income using a sequence of
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possibly non-linear functions {Tt(y)}∞t=0, where y is labor income and Tt(y) are the taxes paid
by the consumer. The government uses taxes to finance a stream of expenditure {Gt}∞t=0 and
repay government debt {Dt}∞t=0.
In our quantitative analysis we focus on the comparison of stationary equilibria. For that
reason, instead of giving a general definition of competitive equilibrium, here we only define
stationary recursive competitive equilibria. The formal definition of non-stationary competitive
equilibrium is relegated to Appendix A. In order to define a stationary equilibrium, we assume
that policies (government expenditure, debt and taxes) do not change over time.
Before we define a stationary equilibrium formally, notice that, in the absence of aggregate
productivity shocks, the returns to saving in the form of the two capital types are certain. The
return to government bond is also known in advance. Therefore, in equilibrium all three assets
must pay the same after-tax return, i.e., R = 1 + (rs − δs)(1 − τ s) = 1 + (re − δe)(1 − τ e),
where R refers to the stationary return on the bond holdings. As a result, we do not need to
distinguish between saving through different types of assets in the consumer’s problem. We
denote consumers’ asset holdings by a.
Stationary Recursive Competitive Equilibrium (SRCE). SRCE is two value functions
Vu, Vs, policy functions cu, cs, lu, ls, a
′
u, a
′
s, the firm’s decision rules Ks, Ke, Ls, Lu, government
policies τ c, τ s, τ e, T (·), D,G, two distributions over productivity-asset types λu(z, a), λs(z, a) and
prices wu, ws, rs, re, R such that
1. The value functions and the policy functions solve the consumer problem given prices and
government policies, i.e., for all i ∈ {u, s}:
Vi(z, a) = max
(ci,li,a′i)≥0
u(ci)− v(li) + βi
∑
z′
Πi(z
′|z)vi(z′, a′i) s.t.
(1 + τ c)ci + a
′
i ≤ wizli − T (wizli) +Ra,
where R = 1 + (rs − δs)(1− τ s) = 1 + (re − δe)(1− τ e) is the after-tax asset return.
2. The firm solves:
max
Ks,Ke,Ls,Lu
F (Ks, Ke, Ls, Lu)− rsKs − reKe − wsLs − wuLu.
3. The distribution λi is stationary for each skill type, i.e. for all i : λ
′
i(z, a) = λi(z, a). This
means:
λi(z¯, a¯) =
∫
z
∫
a:a′i(z,a)=a¯
λi(z, a) · da · dΠi(z¯|z).
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4. Markets clear: ∑
i
pii
∫
z
∫
a
a · dλi(z, a) = Ks +Ke +D,
pis
∫
z
∫
a
zls(z, a) · dλs(z, a) = Ls,
piu
∫
z
∫
a
zlu(z, a) · dλu(z, a) = Lu,
C +G+Ks +Ke = F˜ (Ks, Ke, Ls, Lu),
where C =
∑
i=u,s pii
∫
z
∫
a
ci(z, a) · dλi(z, a) denotes aggregate consumption.
5. Government budget constraint is satisfied.
RD +G = D + τ cC + τ e(re − δe)Ke + τ s(rs − δs)Ks + Tagg,
where Tagg =
∑
i=u,s pii
∫
z
∫
a
T (wizli(z, a)) · dλi(z, a) denotes aggregate labor tax revenue.
We explain how we solve for the SRCE in Appendix B.
3 Calibration
To calibrate model parameters, we assume that the SRCE defined in the previous section -
computed using the current U.S. tax system - coincides with the current U.S. economy. We first
fix a number of parameters to values from the data or from the literature. These parameters are
summarized in Table 1. We then calibrate the remaining parameters so that the SRCE matches
the U.S. data along selected dimensions. Our calibration procedure is summarized in Table 2.
We assume that the period utility function takes the form
u(c)− v(l) = c
1−σ
1− σ − φ
l1+γ
1 + γ
.
One period in our model corresponds to one year. In the benchmark case, we use σ = 2 and
γ = 1. These are within the range of values that have been considered in the literature. We
calibrate φ to match the average labor supply.
We further assume that the production function takes the same form as in Krusell, Ohanian,
R´ıos-Rull, and Violante (2000):
Y = F (Ks, Ke, Ls, Lu) = K
α
s
(
ν [ωKρe + (1− ω)Lρs]
η
ρ + (1− ν)Lηu
) 1−α
η
. (1)
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Table 1: Benchmark Parameters
Parameter Symbol Value Source
Preferences
Relative risk aversion parameter σ 2
Inverse Frisch elasticity γ 1
Technology
Structure capital depreciation rate δs 0.056 GHK
Equipment capital depreciation rate δe 0.124 GHK
Share of structure capital in output α 0.117 KORV
Measure of elasticity of substitution between
equipment capital Ke and unskilled labor Lu η 0.401 KORV
Measure of elasticity of substitution between
equipment capital Ke and skilled labor Ls ρ -0.495 KORV
Relative supply of skilled workers ps/pu 0.778 U.S. Census
Productivity
Productivity persistence of skilled workers ρs 0.9408 KL
Productivity volatility of skilled workers var(εs) 0.1000 KL
Productivity persistence of unskilled workers ρu 0.8713 KL
Productivity volatility of unskilled workers var(εu) 0.1920 KL
Government polices
Labor tax progressivity τ l 0.18 HSV
Overall tax on structure capital income τ s 0.422 Gravelle (2011)
Overall tax on equipment capital income τ e 0.371 Gravelle (2011)
Consumption tax τ c 0.05 KL
Government consumption G/Y 0.16 NIPA
Government debt D/Y 0.6 St. Louis FED
This table reports the benchmark parameters that we take directly from the literature or the data. The acronyms GHK, KORV,
HSV, and KL stand for Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell (1997), Krusell, Ohanian, R´ıos-Rull, and Violante (2000), Heathcote,
Storesletten, and Violante (2012), and Krueger and Ludwig (2013), respectively. NIPA stands for the National Income and Product
Accounts.
Krusell, Ohanian, R´ıos-Rull, and Violante (2000) estimate α, ρ, η, and we use their estimates,
but they do not estimate ω and ρ. We calibrate these parameters to U.S. data, as we explain in
detail below.
As for government policies, we assume that the government consumption-to-output ratio
equals 16%, which is close to the average ratio in the United States during the period 1980 –
2012, as reported in the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) data. To approximate
the progressive U.S. labor tax code, we follow Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2012) and
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assume that tax liability given labor income y is defined as:
T (y) = y¯
[
y
y¯
− λ
(
y
y¯
)1−τ l]
,
where y¯ is the mean labor income in the economy, 1−λ is the average tax rate of a mean income
individual, and τ l controls the progressivity of the tax code. Using 2005 CPS data, Heathcote,
Storesletten, and Violante (2012) estimate τ l = 0.18. We use their estimate and calibrate λ to
clear the government budget.
Gravelle (2011) documents that because of differences in tax depreciation rates, the effective
tax rates on structure capital and equipment capital differ at the firm level. Specifically, the
effective corporate tax rate on structure capital is 32% and the effective corporate tax rate
on equipment capital is 26%. We assume that the capital income tax rate at the consumer
level is 15%, which approximates the U.S. tax code. This implies an overall tax on structure
capital of τ s = 1 − 0.85 · (1 − 0.32) = 42.2% and an overall tax on equipment capital of
τ e = 1− 0.85 · (1− 0.26) = 37.1%. These numbers are in line with a 40% tax, which Domeij and
Heathcote (2004) report for aggregate capital stock. We follow Krueger and Ludwig (2013) and
assume that the consumption tax τ c = 5.0%.
7 Finally, we assume a government debt of 60% of
GDP, as in the U.S. between 1990 and the last recession.
We set the ratio of skilled to unskilled agents to be consistent with the 2011 US Census
data. We cannot identify the mean levels of the idiosyncratic labor productivity shock z for
the two types of agents separately from the remaining parameters of the production function
and therefore set E[z] = 1 for both skilled and unskilled. This assumption implies that wi
corresponds to the average wage rate of agents of skill type i. Thus, skill premium in the model
economy is given by ws/wu. We assume that the processes for z differ across the two types of
agents. Specifically, we assume that for all i ∈ {u, s} : log zt+1 = ρi log zt+εi,t. Following Krueger
and Ludwig (2013), we pick ρs = 0.9408, var(εs) = 0.0100, ρu = 0.8713, var(εu) = 0.0192. We
approximate these processes by finite number Markov chains using the Rouwenhorst method
described in Kopecky and Suen (2010).
There are still six parameter values left to be determined: these are the two production
function parameters, ω and ν, which govern the income shares of equipment capital, skilled
labor and unskilled labor, the labor disutility parameter φ, the discount factors βs and βu,
and the parameter governing the overall level of taxes in the tax function, λ. We calibrate ω
and ν so that (i) the labor share equals 2/3 (approximately the average labor share in 1980 –
2010 as reported in the NIPA data) and (ii) the skill premium ws/wu equals 1.8 (as reported
7For the details on the computation of this number, see Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar (1994).
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Table 2: Benchmark Calibration Procedure
Parameter Symbol Value Target Data and SRCE Source
Production function
parameter ω 0.4800 Labor share 2/3 NIPA
Production function
parameter ν 0.6551 Skill premium wswu 1.8 HPV
Disutility of labor φ 123.7 Labor supply 1/3
Skilled discount factor βs 0.9825 Capital-to-output ratio 2.9 NIPA, FAT
Unskilled discount factor βu 0.9807 Relative wealth 2.680 Census
Tax function parameter λ 0.8423 Gvt. budget balance
This table reports our benchmark calibration procedure. The production function parameters ν and ω control the income share
of equipment capital, skilled and unskilled labor in output. The tax function parameter λ controls the labor income tax rate of
the mean income agent. Relative wealth refers to the ratio of the average skilled to average unskilled agents’ asset holdings. The
acronym HPV stands for Heathcote, Perri, and Violante (2010). NIPA stands for the National Income and Product Accounts, and
FAT stands for the Fixed Asset Tables.
by Heathcote, Perri, and Violante (2010) for the 2000s). We choose φ so that the aggregate
labor supply in steady state equals 1/3 (as is commonly assumed in the macro literature). We
calibrate βs and βu so that (i) the capital-to-output ratio equals 2.9 (approximately the average
of 1980 – 2011 as reported in the NIPA and Fixed Asset Tables data), and (ii) the asset holdings
of an average skilled agent are 2.68 times those of an average unskilled agent (as in the 2010
Census). Finally, following Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2012), we choose λ to clear
the government budget constraint in equilibrium. Table 2 summarizes our calibration procedure.
4 Consequences of the Reform
In this section, we use the model calibrated in Section 3 to analyze the aggregate and dis-
tributional consequences of a budget neutral capital tax reform that equates the tax rates on
structure and equipment capital. We are interested in measuring the effects of reforming the
capital tax system alone. Therefore, we keep other government policies intact. Specifically, the
government needs to finance the pre-reform level of expenditure and debt in the new steady
state. The labor income tax code is not modified either.8 To sum up, the reform finds the
uniform tax rate on the two types of capital that clears the overall government’s budget given
that no other government policy instruments change.
8Observe that labor income tax revenue might still change since the capital tax reform affects prices and
people’s labor supply in equilibrium.
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We first analyze the effects of the budget neutral uniform capital tax reform on prices and
macroeconomic quantities. Second, we show that the reform improves both productive effi-
ciency and (between-group) equality. Third, we compute how the reform affects aggregate and
individual welfare.
A brief summary of our results is as follows. We find that the reform equates capital taxes
at 39.66%. This means that the tax rate on equipment capital increases by about 3 percentage
points whereas the tax rate on structure capital decreases by approximately the same amount.
The change in the average capital tax is negligible. As a result of the tax changes, the amount
of equipment capital decreases and the amount of structure capital increases. Interestingly, the
average return to capital stays almost the same even though the total capital stock increases
and the supply of both types of labor decline in the new steady state. This is due to the fact
that the reform improves the productive efficiency of the economy by reallocating capital from
low return capital to high return capital. In addition, we find that the reform gives rise to a
more egalitarian distribution of consumption and hours worked between skilled and unskilled
agents. The average steady-state welfare increases by 0.09%. This is a substantial welfare gain
given that the reform involves a relatively modest change to the capital tax system.
Finally, our results are robust to alternative preference specifications, labor tax progressivity,
and the degree of individual wage risk. Interpreting the United States as an open economy which
faces a fixed interest rate does not change the main results substantially either. The reform is
more redistributive for a higher degree of equipment-skill complementarity.
4.1 Macroeconomic Variables
Taxes and Prices. The first two rows of Table 3 display the current capital taxes as well
as the uniform tax rate implied by the tax reform. We find that the uniform tax rate that
applies to both types of capital and satisfies government’s budget given the status quo labor
income taxes, debt, and spending policies is 39.66%. Importantly, as we report in the third
row of the table, the average tax on capital is almost unchanged. This implies that the reform
we analyze changes the mix between equipment and structure capital taxes, but leaves overall
capital taxation virtually unaffected.9
The three rows in the middle of Table 3 report the pre-tax returns to capital net of depreci-
9The tax numbers reported in the table are cumulative in the sense that they accumulate the capital income
taxes that are paid at the firm level and at the consumer level. Alternatively, we can deduct the 15% flat capital
income tax that consumers face to get the effective corporate capital income tax rates. In that case, while the
pre-reform corporate effective tax rate on equipments is 26% and that on structures is 32%, the post-reform
uniform effective corporate tax rate is 29.01%. This number could be interpreted as the statutory corporate
tax rate if the equality of the effective tax rates on equipment and structure capital was achieved by setting the
depreciation allowances for the two types of capital equal their actual economic depreciation rates.
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Table 3: Taxes and Prices Before and After the Reform
Variable Status Quo Reform Change
τ s 42.20% 39.66% -6.0%
τ e 37.10% 39.66% 6.9%
avg. τ 39.62% 39.66% 0.1%
rs − δs 2.56% 2.45% -4.1%
re − δe 2.35% 2.45% 4.3%
avg. r − δ 2.46% 2.45% -0.04%
ws/wu 1.8 1.7964 -0.20%
ws 0.5495 0.5491 -0.09%
wu 0.3053 0.3056 0.11%
This table reports the effects of the uniform capital tax reform on steady-state taxes and prices. τs denotes the tax on structure
capital, τe denotes the tax on equipment capital, avg. τ denotes the average tax on capital. rs − δs denotes the pre-tax return on
structure capital net of depreciation δs, re − δe denotes the pre-tax return on equipment capital net of depreciation δe, and avg.
r − δ denotes the average return on capital net of depreciation. ws denotes the average wage of the skilled agents, wu denotes the
average wage of the unskilled agents, and ws/wu denotes ratio of skilled to unskilled wages, i.e. the skill premium.
ation before and after the reform. The fourth and the fifth rows show that after the reform the
return to structure capital declines while the return to equipment capital increases until they
are equalized.10 This is because the reform gives rise to an increase in the level of structure
capital and a decrease in the level of equipment capital, as reported in Table 4. The sixth
row of Table 3 displays the average returns to aggregate capital where the average is computed
by weighing the return to each type of capital by its amount. We see, maybe somewhat sur-
prisingly, that the average return to capital does not change much even though the aggregate
capital stock increases and the level of both types of labor inputs decline (see Table 4 below).
With diminishing returns to capital and capital-labor complementarity, one would expect the
observed changes in aggregate capital stock and labor supply to decrease the average return to
capital further. However, because of the uniform capital tax reform, there is capital reallocation
from the capital with lower returns, equipment capital, towards the capital with higher returns,
structure capital. This reallocation prevents the average return to capital from decreasing fur-
ther. The fact that the average return to capital remains virtually unchanged suggests that the
reform improves productive efficiency. We quantify and discuss the improvement in productive
efficiency in detail in Section 4.2.
Finally, the last three rows of Table 3 report the effects of the reform on wages. First, the skill
premium, ws/wu, decreases. This is a direct implication of the decline in the stock of equipment
10The non-arbitrage condition implies that after-tax returns to the two types of capital must be equal. After
the reform, the capital tax is uniform and, thus, the pre-tax returns to the two types of capital are equal as well.
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capital and the assumptions on technology. We also find that the average wage of the skilled
agents, ws, decreases whereas the average wage of the unskilled agents, wu, increases. This
is because the reform increases the amount of structure capital in the new steady state. This
implies that wages of both types of agents increase by the same proportion since, by Assumption
1, the complementarity between structure capital and the two types of labor is the same. The
reform also decreases the level of equipment capital which depresses the wages of both types of
agents. However, because of equipment-skill complementarity formalized in Assumption 2, the
impact on skilled wages is larger. Quantitatively, we find that the cumulative effect is negative
for skilled wages and positive for unskilled wages.
Allocations. Table 4 displays the effects of the tax reform on aggregate allocations. The
left panel shows how factors of production and total output are affected. The right panel shows
how net after-tax capital income and consumption for the two groups of agents change.
The lower tax rate on structure capital gives rise to an increase in its level in the new steady
state. In contrast, the higher tax rate on equipment capital results in a lower level of equipment
capital. Overall, we find that the reform increases the steady state level of total capital stock
by 0.40%. The increase in the total capital stock is due to the fact that the reform increases
the average productivity of a given amount of capital by eliminating the distortion in capital
allocation. We find that skilled labor supply decreases by 0.01% and unskilled labor supply
decreases by 0.05%. The reason for the labor supply changes is as follows. As reported in
Table 3, wages decrease for the skilled agents. A decline in wages pushes labor supply up due
to an income effect and down due to a substitution effect. When σ > 1, as in our benchmark
parameterization, the income effect dominates, which implies that skilled labor supply should
increase with wage.11 In addition, skilled labor supply is pushed down because of an income
effect related to the increase in the skilled agents’ average net after-tax capital income (R−1)·As
(see the right panel of the Table 4). It turns out that these effects almost offset each other and
the skilled labor supply decreases only slightly. In contrast, as reported in Table 3, unskilled
wages increase, and this pushes unskilled labor supply down since σ > 1. In addition, average
unskilled capital income (R − 1) · Au increases which decreases their labor supply. In the end,
unskilled labor supply decreases more than skilled labor supply. Overall, we find that changes
in the levels of factors of production lead to an increase in output.
The first two rows of the right panel of Table 4 report the average consumption levels of
the skilled agents, Cs, and the unskilled agents, Cu. We find that consumption of the skilled
agents decreases. The reason is that the negative effect of the decrease in the skilled agents’
wages on their consumption dominates the positive effect of the increase in their capital income.
11This comparative statics result holds exactly in a static model without wealth. The presence of positive
wealth weakens the income effect.
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Table 4: Changes in Allocations due to the Reform
Variable Change Variable Change
Ks 1.34% Cs -0.02 %
Ke -0.53% Cu 0.07%
K 0.40% C 0.02%
Ls -0.01% (R− 1) · As 0.50 %
Lu -0.05% (R− 1) · Au 0.42 %
L -0.04%
Y 0.02%
This table reports the effects of the uniform capital tax reform on allocations. “Change” refers to the change between the pre-refom
and post-reform steady state. Ke denotes equipment capital, Ks denotes structure capital, K denotes aggregate capital, Ls denotes
the average supply of skilled labor, Lu denotes the average supply of unskilled labor, Y denotes output, and Net Output denotes
Y − δsKs − δeKe. Cs denotes the average skilled consumption, Cu denotes the average unskilled consumption, and C denotes
average (aggregate) consumption. (R− 1) ·As denotes the average after-tax return to skilled agents’ asset holdings, and (R− 1) ·Au
denotes the average after-tax return to unskilled agents’ asset holdings.
Unskilled consumption, on the other hand, increases, because both wages and capital income of
the unskilled agents increase.
4.2 Productive Efficiency and Equality
In this section, we discuss the efficiency and (between-group) equality consequences of the uni-
form capital tax reform. We find that the reform improves productive efficiency and increases
the degree of equality between skilled and unskilled agents.
Productive Efficiency. Productive efficiency measures how efficient the economy is in
turning inputs into output. The productive efficiency result of Diamond and Mirrlees (1971)
suggests that the differential tax treatment of the two types of capital might create inefficiencies
by distorting capital accumulation decisions. Indeed, as we prove in Section 5, a Ramsey planner
that does not have redistributive concerns finds it optimal to tax equipments and structures at
the same rate. This implies that uniform capital tax reform should improve productive efficiency.
Intuitively, in the steady state before the reform, the pre-tax return to structure capital is higher
than the pre-tax return to equipment capital. A reform towards uniform capital taxation creates
capital reallocation from the capital with lower returns, equipment capital, towards the capital
with higher returns, structure capital. This reallocation, then, brings the economy closer to its
production possibility frontier increasing output for a given level of capital.
To measure the productive efficiency gains of the reform, we compare the before and after
reform net output, i.e. Y − δsKs− δeKe. We focus on net output, because it takes into account
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the depreciation costs of using different types of capital and thus measures the available resources
in the economy after depreciated capital has been replaced. Obviously, the tax reform does not
only affect the way aggregate capital is allocated across the two capital types but it also changes
the level of aggregate capital and the supply of both types of labor. In fact, in our benchmark
analysis, the supply of both types of labor decrease, putting a downward pressure on net output.
Similarly, the increase in total capital stock puts a upward pressure on net output. In order
to isolate the change in net output that is due to capital reallocation, we decompose the total
change in net output as follows.
We define an auxiliary interim allocation in which the aggregate capital and the labor supplies
of both skilled and unskilled agents are kept constant at the pre-reform steady-state levels. In
this interim allocation, capital is allocated across the two capital types in a way that equates
their net marginal returns (i.e., rs− δs = re− δe), which is what happens when taxes on the two
types of capital are equalized. The change in net output from the pre-reform steady state to the
interim allocation measures the gains of allocating the pre-reform amount of aggregate capital
across the two types of capital more efficiently.12 We call these gains reallocation gains.13 We
find that the reallocation gains amount to 0.0016% of net output. We also consider the average
net return to capital as an alternative measure of how efficiently capital is used in production.
We find that the average net return to capital is 1.35% higher in the interim allocation than in
the pre-reform steady state.
Between-Group Equality. Next, we discuss the consequences of the reform for the degree
of equality between the skilled and the unskilled agents. The discussion of how the reform affects
within-group inequality is postponed to Section 4.4. Before the reform unskilled agents work
more than skilled agents. As reported in Table 4, after the reform, both labor supplies decline
but unskilled labor supply declines more, implying a more equal distribution of hours worked
across agents. Second, skilled consumption declines and unskilled consumption increases, which
makes the consumption distribution more equal. This is especially interesting given the fact that
the labor tax code is kept intact. There is more equality after the uniform capital tax reform
because the reform redistributes indirectly from the skilled to the unskilled agents by decreasing
the skill premium. By increasing the tax rate on equipment capital, the reform decreases the level
of equipment capital. Under the assumption of equipment-skill complementarity, the decline in
equipment capital then decreases the skill premium as shown in the last row of Table 3.14
12Observe that with a fixed total capital stock and fixed labor supplies, net output is maximized when the net
marginal returns are equalized across the two types of capital, i.e. at the interim allocation.
13The tax reform affects the allocation of labor as well. Our measure of reallocation gains, however, measures
the gains coming from a better allocation of capital alone and deliberately ignores the gains arising from a better
allocation of labor by not optimizing over labor in the interim allocation. In this sense, our measure provides a
lower bound for total reallocation gains.
14In fact, in Section 5 we show that a planner who wants to redistribute from skilled to unskilled agents might
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It is important to realize that eliminating capital tax differentials always improves efficiency
in our model. Because of the nature of the pre-reform capital tax differentials in the U.S. tax
code (structure capital tax rate being higher than equipment capital tax rate), the uniform
capital tax reform that we consider also increases equality. As a result, this reform does not
suffer from the efficiency vs. equality tradeoff, which is present in many other tax reforms.
In the next section, we evaluate how the efficiency and equality improvements of the reform
manifest themselves in terms of welfare.
4.3 Welfare Gains
In this section, we analyze the steady state welfare gains of switching from the current capital
tax system to a system with a uniform 39.66% capital tax rate. Our measure of welfare gains
and losses is standard. The welfare gains of allocation x relative to allocation y are defined as a
fraction by which the consumption in allocation y would have to be increased in each date and
state in order to make its welfare equal to the welfare of allocation x.
First, we want to evaluate the effect of the reform on aggregate welfare. To do so, we consider
a Utilitarian social welfare function which puts an equal weight on every agent. This welfare
criterion also represents the ex-ante welfare of an individual who has a probability ps of being
born as a skilled agent and a probability pu of being born as an unskilled agent. The welfare gains
of the uniform capital tax reform are 0.09% in consumption equivalent units. Then, we evaluate
the welfare consequences of the reform for skilled and unskilled agents separately. We find that
the average skilled welfare declines by 0.01% whereas the average unskilled welfare increases
by 0.15%. We interpret these findings as follows. The reform, by abolishing tax differentials,
increases productive efficiency, which increases welfare for both types of agents. However, the
reform also depresses equipment capital accumulation, and hence, decreases the skill premium,
which implies indirect redistribution from the skilled agents to the unskilled agents. It turns
out that, under our benchmark parameterization, the efficiency gains and redistribution losses
incurring to the skilled agents almost fully offset each other, resulting in a small welfare loss.
For the unskilled agents, the redistributive gains plus the efficiency gains sum up to a significant
welfare gain of 0.15%.
A Reform where No Type Loses. We also analyze a uniform capital tax reform, in
which the government distributes a larger share of the efficiency gains to the skilled agents to
ensure that the average skilled welfare is unchanged. In this reform, the uniform tax rate on
capital is slightly below the benchmark reform level. This implies a smaller decrease in the skill
premium and, hence, less indirect redistribution from the skilled to the unskilled. To make up
find it optimal to go beyond uniform capital taxation and tax equipments at a higher rate than structures.
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for the capital tax revenue loss, the government decreases λ, which increases the overall level of
labor taxes, but does not change labor tax progressivity. In particular, the parameter τ l, which
controls labor tax progressivity, is kept constant. As a result of this reform, unskilled welfare
goes up by 0.15% while skilled welfare does not change by construction (more precisely, the
unskilled gain 0.147% in this reform while they gain 0.150% in the benchmark reform). More
generally, by choosing a lower level of the uniform capital tax rate and the appropriate λ, the
government can distribute a positive share of the overall welfare gains of the reform to the skilled
agents.15
A Reform that Switches the Tax Differential. Given the success of increasing equip-
ment taxes as a redistributive policy, we analyze another budget-neutral tax reform in which we
switch the two capital tax rates, i.e., set τ e = 42.2% and τ s = 37.1%. The labor tax parameter
λ is set so that the government budget is balanced. This reform decreases skilled welfare by
0.05% and increases unskilled welfare by 0.30% relative to status quo. Compared to the bench-
mark uniform capital tax reform, the current reform redistributes more from the skilled to the
unskilled because increasing the tax on equipment capital further decreases the skill premium
further (namely by 0.4% relative to the 0.2% in the benchmark reform). Relative to uniform
capital taxation, this reform hurts productive efficiency by creating distortions in allocation of
total capital across equipments and structures. In fact, this reform implies small reallocation
losses (of -0.0001%) relative to the status quo. Nevertheless, the overall welfare gains of this
reform, 0.17%, are substantially larger than that of the benchmark uniform capital tax reform,
0.09%, because redistribution gains dominate productive efficiency losses.16
A Reform with Fixed Aggregate Capital Stock. Our benchmark reform increases the
total capital stock by 0.4% from the initial to the the new steady state. Comparing welfare
across steady states with different capital levels can be problematic since raising capital from
one steady state to the next might be costly over the transition. Therefore, to abstract from
the steady-state welfare gains coming from the increase in aggregate capital, we consider an
alternative reform, in which we choose the uniform capital tax rate so that the aggregate capital
stock is constant across steady states.17 We find that aggregate welfare increases by 0.06%,
15For instance, there is a reform that distributes all the gains of uniform capital taxation to the skilled agents
subject to keeping unskilled welfare unchanged. In this reform, skilled welfare increases by 0.48%. The welfare
gains of this reform should be taken with caution though. The reason is that, unlike the benchmark reform, in
which average taxes on capital remain almost unchanged, this alternative reform decreases the average taxes on
capital significantly, to 36.61%, and increases labor tax collection substantially. As a result, steady-state level
of total capital stock increases much more than it does in the benchmark reform, namely by 1.7%, which makes
steady-state welfare comparison less desirable.
16We do not analyze reforms in which equipment capital tax is increased substantially because in such cases
the skill premium would decrease significantly and this might affect people’s education attainment decisions. As
a result, analyzing such reforms would require modeling education decisions explicitly which goes beyond the
scope of this paper.
17The uniform capital tax rate that keeps the aggregate capital at the pre-reform steady-state level is 40.55%,
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Table 5: Pre-tax Labor Earnings Inequality
Variable Status Quo Reform Change
Skilled Pre-tax Labor Earnings
Variance of logs 0.1271 0.1273 0.17%
Gini 0.1963 0.1965 0.07%
Unskilled Pre-tax Labor Earnings
Variance of logs 0.1319 0.1320 0.07%
Gini 0.2015 0.2016 0.03%
This table reports the effects of the benchmark uniform capital tax reform on steady-state measures of labor earnings inequality.
which implies that two thirds of the welfare gains in the benchmark reform are coming from a
more efficient allocation of the pre-reform amount of aggregate capital between equipment and
structure capital.
4.4 Within-Group Inequality
In this section, we perform two distinct exercises. First, we investigate the effects of uniform
capital tax reform on within-group inequality by comparing the variances of log labor earnings
and the Gini coefficients of labor earnings for each skill group before and after the reform.
Second, we analyze whether the quantitative consequences of the reform are robust to the
degree of labor productivity risk.
Effects of the Reform on Within-Group Inequality. In Section 4.2, we explain how
the uniform capital tax reform affects the distribution of resources between skilled and unskilled
agents but remain silent on the effects of the reform on the distribution of resources within each
skill group. This is what we explore in this section. There are two channels through which
the reform might affect within-group earnings inequality. First, by increasing (decreasing) the
marginal product of labor of a skill group, it scales up (down) the variance of wages. Second, this
change in wages affects people’s labor supply responses. However, since both the Gini coefficient
and the variance of logs are scale independent inequality measures, they do not capture the first
channel. Therefore, the changes in within-group labor earnings inequality reported in Table 5 are
due to endogenous labor supply responses. The last column of the table shows that within-group
earnings inequality increases for both skill groups slightly.
Role of Labor Productivity Risk. Our benchmark calibration does not replicate the wage
inequality that we observe in the United States: Heathcote, Perri, and Violante (2010) report
which is higher than the one in the benchmark reform, 39.66%. This creates extra revenues for the government,
and thus, to keep the government budget balanced, we decrease the total labor tax revenue by increasing λ.
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Table 6: Pre-tax Labor Earnings Inequality with Calibrated Wage Risk
Variable Status Quo Reform Change
Skilled Pre-tax Labor Earnings
Variance of logs 0.4398 0.4405 0.16%
Gini 0.3521 0.3523 0.05%
Unskilled Pre-tax Labor Earnings
Variance of logs 0.4524 0.4527 0.08%
Gini 0.3583 0.3584 0.03%
This table reports the effects of the uniform capital tax reform on steady-state measures of labor earnings inequality in an environment
with calibrated wage risk. In particular, we increase the variance of the idiosyncratic shocks so as to match the variance of logged
wages of 0.45 as reported by Heathcote, Perri, and Violante (2010).
that the variance of log wages equals 0.45 in the data whereas in our benchmark calibration
this number is 0.17. The question then is: Are our results regarding the effects of the reform
on within-group inequality biased by the fact that the model does not match the observed wage
inequality in the first place? To answer this question, we provide an alternative calibration of
the model in which we also match the variance of log wages in the model to the U.S. data. We
do so by scaling up the variances of the productivity shocks of the two skill types by a common
factor κ so that the variance of log wages equals 0.45 as in the data. The persistence parameters
ρs and ρu are kept the same as in the benchmark calibration. We conduct the uniform capital
tax reform for this environment. The last column of Table 6 shows that the implications of the
reform on within-group inequality are quantitatively similar to the benchmark calibration.
We also analyze the robustness of our main results to variations in productivity risk. We
compare the efficiency and (between-group) equality consequences of the reform under the “Cal-
ibrated risk” parameterization specified above to the one under benchmark calibration by com-
paring the first and second columns of Table 7. We find that higher productivity risk does not
produce results significantly different from the benchmark results. To render a more complete
robustness check, we also evaluate the consequences of the reform for a version of our econ-
omy where we decrease the variance of productivity shocks substantially (namely by setting
κ = 0.1).18 The results of this exercise are reported in the column called “Low risk” in Table 7.
Again, we find that our results are robust. To the extent that one interprets the wage risk as
the residual uninsured wage risk, we can read these results as saying that the consequences of
the uniform capital tax reform are robust to the degree of market incompleteness.
18In the limit, decreasing the variance of the skill shocks further would lead to a representative agent environ-
ment. We chose not to go all the way to the representative agent environment, because with two representative
agents, the steady state equilibrium is not unique and the comparison to the benchmark reform is not straight-
forward.
21
Table 7: Role of Wage Risk
Benchmark Calibrated risk Low risk
uniform tax 39.66% 39.67% 39.66%
reallocation gains 0.0016% 0.0016% 0.0016%
ws/wu -0.20% -0.22% -0.19%
welfare gains 0.09% 0.08% 0.09%
skilled gains -0.01% -0.01% -0.01%
unskilled gains 0.15% 0.15% 0.15%
This table reports the results of the reform for different levels of wage risk. The column ”Benchmark” refers to the benchmark
quantitative analysis. The column “Calibrated risk” refers to an exercise in which we increase the variance of the idiosyncratic
shocks so as to match the variance of logged wages of 0.45 as reported by Heathcote, Perri, and Violante (2010). The column “Low
risk” refers to an exercise in which we decrease the variance of the idiosyncratic shocks ten times, bringing the model closer to a
model with two representative agents. In both exercises, we keep the skill persistence parameters unchanged. Regarding the rows of
the table, “uniform tax” refers to the uniform tax on equipment and structure capital that leaves steady state government budget
balanced, “reallocation gains” refers to the change in net output associated with a better allocation of capital, “ws/wu” denotes
the ratio of skilled to unskilled wages. “Welfare gains” denote the aggregate steady state welfare gains of the reform, while “skilled
gains” (“unskilled gains”) refers to the skilled (unskilled) agents’ steady state welfare gains.
4.5 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, we analyze the sensitivity of our quantitative results to the parameters that
control preferences, technology, and progressivity of the labor tax code. Specifically, we perform
the following exercise. We change the parameter of interest and keep all other parameters that
we do not calibrate fixed. We recalibrate the model under this new parameterization. Then, we
conduct the uniform capital tax reform, and evaluate the changes in macroeconomic aggregates
and welfare in the new steady state. The results are summarized in Table 8 and Table 9. In
addition, we also analyze an open economy version of the model. These results are reported in
Table 10. The main finding is that our main results are quite robust to changes in parameters
and openness of the economy.
In particular, we find that the reform decreases the steady state level of equipment capital
and increases the steady state level of structure capital in all the sensitivity exercises we con-
duct. Similarly, it is always the case that consumption and hours worked become more equally
distributed between skilled and unskilled agents. In Table 8, Table 9 and Table 10, we do not
report these results, but instead focus on the efficiency and equality consequences of the reform.
Sensitivity to Preference Parameters. Table 8 shows that our main results are robust
to changes in preference parameters. First, the uniform capital tax rate is very close to the
benchmark value in all the exercises. Second, as in the benchmark case, there are productive
efficiency gains from capital reallocation as shown in the row called “reallocation gains.” Third,
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Table 8: Sensitivity to Preference Parameters
Benchmark Benchmark
σ 1 2 4 2 2 2
γ 1 1 1 0.5 1 2
uniform tax 39.62% 39.66% 39.68% 39.67% 39.66% 39.64%
reallocation gains 0.0016% 0.0016% 0.0017% 0.0016% 0.0016% 0.0016%
ws/wu -0.15% -0.20% -0.27% -0.21% -0.20% -0.18%
welfare gains 0.04% 0.09% 0.12% 0.09% 0.09% 0.09%
skilled gains 0.01% -0.01% -0.07% -0.02% -0.01% -0.001%
unskilled gains 0.06% 0.15% 0.21% 0.16% 0.15% 0.14%
This table reports the sensitivity of our main quantitative results to preference parameters. Each column reports the results for
a particular combination of σ (the curvature of utility from consumption) and γ (the curvature of disutility of labor). We always
change a particular parameter and leave the rest of the parameters that are not calibrated unaffected. Regarding the rows of the
table, “uniform tax” refers to the uniform tax on equipment and structure capital that leaves steady state government budget
balanced, “reallocation gains” refers to the change in net output associated with a more efficient allocation of capital, “ws/wu”
denotes the ratio of skilled to unskilled wages. “Welfare gains” denote the aggregate steady state welfare gains of the reform, while
“skilled gains” (“unskilled gains”) refers to the skilled (unskilled) agents’ steady state welfare gains.
the skill premium decreases by roughly 0.2% in all the exercises, which implies a more equal
distribution of consumption and labor across agents. We conclude that our finding that the
uniform capital tax reform improves both efficiency and equality is robust to preference param-
eters. Aggregate steady state welfare gains are around 0.1%, they increase with σ, but do not
change much with γ. Typically, skilled agents lose and unskilled agents gain from the reform.
An interesting case is the one with σ = γ = 1, in which both types of agents gain. The reason
is that in this parameterization, the decline in skilled consumption is very modest and is more
than offset by the decrease in skilled labor supply. This case shows that the uniform capital
tax reform increases both types’ average welfare for a set of reasonable parameter values, even
without being accompanied by a modification of the labor tax code.
Additional Sensitivity. Each column in Table 9, starting with the second one, reports an
additional sensitivity exercise. The first row of the table shows that, in all these exercises, the
uniform capital tax rate is very close to the benchmark value. In addition, the second and third
rows of Table 9 show that the reform improves both efficiency and equality as in the benchmark
case. Next, we discuss each robustness exercise reported in Table 9 in more detail.
Elasticity of Substitution. The column denoted by “η = 0.79” reports the consequences
of the reform in an economy with higher elasticity of substitution between equipment capital and
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Table 9: Additional Sensitivity
Benchmark η = 0.79 ρ = −1 τ l = 0.15 τ l = 0.21 Uniform β
uniform tax 39.66% 39.67% 39.65% 39.65% 39.67% 39.29%
reallocation gains 0.0016% 0.0017% 0.0014% 0.0016% 0.0016% 0.0016%
ws/wu -0.20% -0.28% -0.24% -0.20% -0.20% -0.17%
welfare gains 0.09% 0.10% 0.10% 0.09% 0.09% 0.10%
skilled gains -0.01% -0.05% -0.02% -0.01% -0.01% -0.02%
unskilled gains 0.15% 0.19% 0.18% 0.15% 0.15% 0.17%
This table reports additional sensitivity results. Each column reports the results for a particular parameter specification. We always
change a particular parameter and leave the rest of the parameters that are not calibrated unaffected. “η = 0.79” refers to an
exercise in which we increase the elasticity of substitution between equipment capital and unskilled labor by increasing η from its
benchmark value of 0.401 to 0.79. The column “ρ = −1” refers to an exercise in which we decrease the elasticity of substitution
between equipment capital and skilled labor by increasing ρ from its benchmark value of −0.495 to −1. The columns “τ l = 0.15”
and “τ l = 0.21” refer to exercises in which we change the labor progressivity parameter τ l from its benchmark value of 0.18. The
column “Uniform β” refers to an exercise in which all agents are assumed to have the same discount factor. Regarding the rows of
the table, “uniform tax” refers to the uniform tax on equipment and structure capital that leaves steady state government budget
balanced, “reallocation gains” refers to the the change in net output associated with a better allocation of capital, “ws/wu” denotes
the ratio of skilled to unskilled wages. “Welfare gains” denote the aggregate steady state welfare gains of the reform, while “skilled
gains” (“unskilled gains”) refers to the skilled (unskilled) agents’ steady state welfare gains.
unskilled labor.19 Specifically, we set η = 0.79 instead of the benchmark value of η = 0.401.20
For this elasticity value, we observe that skilled welfare decreases more and unskilled welfare
increases more relative to the benchmark parameterization. This is intuitive: higher η means a
lower degree of complementarity between equipment capital and unskilled labor. In that case,
a decline in equipment capital decreases unskilled wages less and, therefore, depresses the skill
premium more relative to the benchmark case, as reported in the third row of Table 9. This
means that there is a higher degree of indirect redistribution from the skilled to the unskilled.
The average welfare gain is higher relative to the benchmark case because of the concavity of
the utility function.
The column denoted by “ρ = −1” reports the consequences of the reform in an economy with
a lower elasticity of substitution between equipment capital and skilled labor (in the benchmark
ρ = −0.495). The results are similar to those in the previous exercise, which is intuitive: lower ρ
means a higher degree of complementarity between equipment capital and skilled labor, which, in
relative terms, is similar to a lower degree of complementarity between equipments and unskilled
19Given the aggregate production function specified in (1), the elasticity of substitution between unskilled
labor and equipment capital is 1/(1−η), while the elasticity of substitution between skilled labor and equipment
capital is 1/(1− ρ).
20This value has been used, for example, in He and Liu (2008), who use the same production function as ours,
and comes from an empirical study by Duffy, Papageorgiou, and Perez-Sebastian (2004).
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labor. To conclude, in a world with a higher degree of equipment-skill complementarity, a greater
portion of the gains of the uniform capital tax reform accrues to the unskilled people, thereby
increasing the egalitarian nature of the reform.
Labor Tax Progressivity. We take the estimate of the progressivity of the labor income
tax code τ l from a study by Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2012). It is likely that
different approaches would yield different results. We, therefore, report the sensitivity of our
results to the progressivity of the labor tax code in the next two columns of Table 9. We decrease
and increase τ l by 1/6 to τ l = 0.15 and τ l = 0.21, respectively, and find that our results are
robust to this change.
Uniform Discount Factors. Next, we calibrate a version of our model in which all agents
have the same discount factor. The results of the uniform tax reform are reported in Table 9
in the column entitled “Uniform β”. We find that our main quantitative results do not depend
on the assumption of heterogenous discount factors. With a uniform discount factor, however,
the calibrated model is not able to match the observed wealth distribution across skilled and
unskilled agents.
Open Economy. The United States is not literally a closed economy, but following the
literature, we consider that scenario a useful benchmark. In this section, we consider the polar
opposite case and analyze the consequences of the uniform capital tax reform assuming that
the United States is a small open economy that faces a fixed world interest rate. This exercise
illustrates to what extent the implications of the uniform capital tax reform depend on the
degree of openness. In particular, we calibrate the after-tax interest rate so that in the steady
state, the net foreign asset position is -20% of GDP, which is approximately the number for the
U.S. economy as reported by the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
The results of the uniform capital tax reform for this environment are reported in Table
10. We find that the reallocation gains and the skill premium changes are very similar to the
closed economy benchmark. For both agents, the welfare gains are smaller in the open economy
exercise. The reason is the following. Recall that equating capital taxes increases the return to
capital due to the reallocation from less to more productive capital. In our benchmark closed
economy, this encourages asset accumulation of domestic agents towards the new steady-state,
which increases their steady-state welfare. In an open economy, higher return to capital implies
an immediate capital inflow from abroad until the (after-tax) return to capital is equal to its
pre-reform level. As a result, the asset holdings of the domestic agents stay largely unchanged
across the steady states. This implies that the change in aggregate capital stock across steady
states does not contribute to the welfare gains of domestic agents. Therefore, not surprisingly,
the overall welfare gains in the open economy exercise are almost the same as the welfare gains
in a closed economy in which we abstract from the effect of capital accumulation on aggregate
25
Table 10: Role of Openness
Benchmark Open Economy
uniform tax 39.66% 39.59%
reallocation gains 0.0016% 0.0016%
ws/wu -0.20% -0.20%
welfare gains 0.09% 0.06%
skilled gains -0.01% -0.05%
unskilled gains 0.15% 0.14%
This table reports the implications of the uniform capital tax reform for different degrees of openness. The column “Benchmark”
refers to the benchmark closed economy exercise. The column “Open Economy” refers to an exercise in which the after-tax interest
is kept fixed. Regarding the rows of the table, “uniform tax” refers to the uniform tax on equipment and structure capital that
leaves steady state government budget balanced, “reallocation gains” refers to the change in net output associated with a more
efficient allocation of capital, “ws/wu” denotes the ratio of skilled to unskilled wages. “Welfare gains” denote the aggregate steady
state welfare gains of the reform, while “skilled gains” (“unskilled gains”) refers to the skilled (unskilled) agents’ steady state welfare
gains.
welfare by keeping aggregate capital fixed. We discuss the details of this exercise in Section 4.3.
5 Theoretical Insights from Ramsey Taxation
The aim of this section is to provide a theoretical justification for why the uniform capital tax
reform enhances productive efficiency. To abstract away from redistribution and insurance roles
of taxation, we consider a version of the economy outlined in Section 2 in which a representative
agent provides both skilled and unskilled labor and faces no productivity shocks. We analyze a
Ramsey tax problem and show that, in such an environment without redistribution and insurance
concerns, it is optimal to tax equipments and structures uniformly. This finding suggests that
uniform capital tax reform should be improving productive efficiency. Through an example, we
also show that, if a planner cares sufficiently about the unskilled agents, then taxing equipments
at a higher rate can be optimal. This result suggests that a move from status quo towards
uniform capital taxes might be improving between-group equality.
Now, we lay out the representative agent economy. There is a representative consumer who
supplies skilled and unskilled labor. The representative consumer has the following preferences
over consumption ct, skilled labor ls,t, and unskilled labor lu,t :
u(ct)− v(ls,t)− v(lu,t).
This is the main distinction of the representative agent economy from the model economy
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outlined in Section 2. Another distinction is that, following the Ramsey tax tradition, we
assume that labor taxes are linear, i.e. Tt(yt) = τ t · yt.21
Representative Agent’s Problem. Taking prices and government policy as given, the
representative agent solves:
max
{ct,ls,t,lu,t,at+1}∞t=0
∞∑
t=0
βt [u(ct)− v(ls,t)− v(lu,t)] s.t. for all t ≥ 0
ct + at+1 ≤ (1− τ t)
∑
i=s,u
li,twi,t +Rtat,
ct, ls,t, lu,t ≥ 0, a0 > 0 given.
where
Rt = [1 + (1− τ s,t)(rs,t − δs)] = [1 + (1− τ e,t)(re,t − δe)] (2)
has to hold in equilibrium.
The asset market clearing condition is:
Ks,t +Ke,t +Dt = at. (3)
Finally, the goods market clears (government’s budget constraint is satisfied by Walras’ Law):
ct +Gt +Ks,t+1 +Ke,t+1 = F˜ (Ks,t, Ke,t, Ls,t, Lu,t). (4)
There are also two labor market clearing conditions given by li,t = Li,t for all t ≥ 0 and
i ∈ {s, u}. In the rest of this section, we impose labor market clearing conditions implicitly by
using li,t and Li,t interchangeably.
The definition of competitive equilibrium is very similar to the one provided for an environ-
ment with productivity shocks and two types of agents in Appendix A, and therefore, is omitted
for the sake of brevity.
Characterization of Equilibrium. Letting pt be the Lagrange multiplier on period t
household budget constraint, the first-order optimality conditions of the representative agent
21In addition, we assume that the measure of each type of agents is one, agents have identical discount factors,
and the government does not tax consumption. These assumptions are made only for expositional purposes and
do not affect the theoretical insights provided in this section.
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are:22
(ct) : β
tu′(ct) = pt, (5)
(li,t) : β
tv′(li,t) = pt(1− τ t)wi,t, for i = s, u, (6)
(at+1) : pt = pt+1Rt+1. (7)
These conditions together with the budget constraint holding with equality every period char-
acterize the representative agent’s decisions given policy and prices.
The following pricing conditions follow from the solution to the representative firm’s problem.
rs,t = F1,t, re,t = F2,t, ws,t = F3,t, wu,t = F4,t. (8)
Ramsey Problem. The government chooses a tax policy such that the resulting equilibrium
allocation maximizes the welfare of the representative agent.23 Following the Ramsey taxation
literature (see Chari and Kehoe (1999)), we use the primal approach and transform the optimal
tax problem above to a problem in which the government chooses allocations directly. In order
to do that, we will show that the equilibrium is characterized by three fairly simple conditions.
The first condition is the resource constraint of the economy (4).
The second condition is an implementability constraint which is derived using the agent’s
budget constraints along with first-order conditions and a transversality condition:
∞∑
t=0
βt [u′(ct)ct − v′(ls,t)ls,t − v′(lu,t)lu,t] = u′(c0)R0a0. (9)
The third constraint follows from the assumption that labor income taxes cannot depend on
labor type.24 With this assumption, the first order conditions with respect to two labor types,
summarized in equation (6), together with the factor pricing conditions in (8), imply that in
any equilibrium:
v′(ls,t)
v′(lu,t)
− F3,t
F4,t
= 0. (10)
22These first order conditions assume that the non-negativity constraints on consumption and labor are not
binding. This is true if u and v satisfy appropriate Inada conditions, which are satisfied by the functions we
consider in the quantitative exercises.
23We restrict the set of policies available to the government by fixing the initial tax rates on both types of
capital to some constant numbers, τs,0 and τe,0. This is a standard assumption in the Ramsey taxation literature.
Without this assumption, the government would raise all necessary revenue through taxing initial capital, which
is non-distortionary.
24The case when labor taxes are allowed to depend on skill types is theoretically interesting, but not relevant
in practice. In the U.S. tax code, labor taxes are functions of labor income only, which is what we pursue in this
paper, both in this section as well as in the quantitative analysis of the uniform capital tax reform.
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The next proposition states formally that these three conditions fully characterize the equi-
librium allocation of consumption, labor, and capital.
Proposition 1. The consumption, labor, and capital allocations and period zero capital tax
rates and return on debt in any competitive equilibrium satisfy conditions (4), (9), and (10).
Moreover, if any consumption, labor, and capital allocations and period zero capital tax rate and
return on debt satisfy these conditions, then one can find a tax policy, a price system, and debt
holdings that, together with the given allocations and period zero prices, constitute a competitive
equilibrium.
Proof. Relegated to Appendix C.
The Ramsey problem can then be formulated as follows.
max
{ct,ls,t,lu,t,Ks,t+1,Ke,t+1}∞t=0
∞∑
t=0
βt [u(ct)− v(ls,t)− v(lu,t)] s.t. (4), (9), and (10).
Proposition 2. Suppose that v(l) = l
1+γ
1+γ
. Then, equipment capital and structure capital are
taxed at a uniform rate in the solution to the Ramsey problem.
Proof. First, we will verify that constraint (10) does not bind by checking that it is satisfied at
the solution to a relaxed problem which does not include constraint (10).
Consider the relaxed problem where we do not include (10) as a constraint. Letting the mul-
tipliers on the feasibility constraint be λt and the multiplier on the implementability constraint
be µ, the first-order optimality conditions with respect to type i labor for i = s, u and all t ≥ 0
are
(li,t) : β
tv′(li,t) + µβ
t[v′′(li,t)li,t + v′(li,t)] = λtwi,t,
which under the assumption on the disutility function can equivalently be written as
βtv′(li,t)[1 + µ(1 + γ)] = λtwi,t. (11)
Dividing (11) for skilled labor by the same equation for unskilled labor and using ws,t = F3,t
and wu,t = F4,t, we get that, for all t ≥ 0,
v′(ls,t)
v′(lu,t)
− F3,t
F4,t
= 0.
This implies that (10) is slack.
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Therefore, the first order conditions with respect to the two capital types are:
(Ks,t+1) : γt = γt+1 [Fs,t+1 + (1− δs)] ,
(Ke,t+1) : γt = γt+1 [Fe,t+1 + (1− δe)] .
Combining the two equations above and using the factor pricing conditions in (8) gives
Fs,t+1 + (1− δs) = Fe,t+1 + (1− δe). (12)
Comparing (12) with (2), which has to hold in any equilibrium, proves the result.
Proposition 2 establishes that a government that is not concerned about redistribution and
insurance finds it optimal to tax equipments and structures at the same rate.25 We interpret
this result as providing a theoretical justification for the productive efficiency gains of uniform
capital tax reform we find in Section 4.
Example with Redistribution. Now we consider the same environment but with two
types of agents, skilled and unskilled, to gain insights into the effects of uniform capital tax
reform on equality.
Representative Agents’ Problem. Taking prices and government policy as given, the
skilled and unskilled representative agents (i.e., ∀i ∈ {s, u}) solve:
max
{ci,t,li,t,ai,t+1}∞t=0
∞∑
t=0
βt [u(ci,t)− v(li,t)] s.t. for all t ≥ 0
ci,t + ai,t+1 ≤ (1− τ t)li,twi,t +Rtai,t,
ci,t, li,t ≥ 0, ai,0 > 0 given,
where Rt = [1 + (1− τ s,t)(rs,t − δs)] = [1 + (1− τ e,t)(re,t − δe)] has to hold in equilibrium.
As in the previous section, we use the primal approach and transform the optimal tax problem
to a problem in which the government chooses allocations directly. The three constraints,
25In doing so, Proposition 2 also contributes to the literature on the optimality of uniform capital taxation.
The productive efficiency result of Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) implies that it is optimal to tax different types
of capital at the same rate in order to avoid production distortions. Auerbach (1979) and Feldstein (1990) show
that, when there are restrictions on the taxation of different inputs to production, similar to the restriction that
different types of labor cannot be taxed at different rates in our environment imposed by constraint (10), then the
Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) result does not hold any more: it might be optimal to tax different types of capital
differently. We recover optimality of uniform capital taxation because, under our functional form assumption
regarding the labor disutility function, labor supply elasticities of skilled and unskilled labor are constant and
identical. This implies that there is no need to tax the two types of labor differently, which is why constraint
(10) does not bind, and hence, we are back in the Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) world.
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equations (13) − (15) in the Ramsey problem below, fully characterize equilibrium allocations
that can be achieved by the taxes available. The first constraint is the resource constraint of
the economy whereas the second constraint consists of an implementability constraint for each
agent. The third constraint follows from the restriction that labor taxes cannot depend on skill
type.
Ramsey Problem.
max
{(ci,t,li,t)i=s,u,Ks,t+1,Ke,t+1}∞t=0
∞∑
t=0
βt
∑
i=s,u
∆i[u(ci,t)− v(li,t)] s.t.
for all t ≥ 0, Gt +
∑
i
ci,t +Ks,t+1 +Ke,t+1 = F˜ (Ks,t, Ke,t, Ls,t, Lu,t), (13)
for all i = s, u,
∞∑
t=0
βt [u′(ci,t)ci,t − v′(li,t)li,t] = u′(ci,0)R0ai,0, (14)
for all t ≥ 0, v
′(ls,t)
v′(lu,t)
u′(cu,t)
u′(cs,t)
− F3,t
F4,t
= 0. (15)
Now we will show through an example that if the society cares sufficiently about unskilled agents,
then this redistributive motive will imply that it is optimal to tax equipments at a higher rate
then structures. In this example, following the parametric assumptions in all our quantitative
exercises, we assume u(c) = c
1−σ
1−σ and v(l) =
l1+γ
1+γ
. Furthermore, suppose σ < 1.26 To provide an
analytical result, we consider an extreme case in which ∆s = 0, meaning that the society only
cares about the unskilled agents.
Letting λt, µi, and ψt be the Lagrange multipliers on the three constraints of the Ramsey
problem respectively and assuming constraint (15) binds with a greater than or equal to sign
(we will verify this by proving the the Lagrange multiplier ψt > 0), the first-order optimality
conditions with respect to the two capital types are:
(Ks,t+1) : λt = λt+1F˜s,t+1, (16)
(Ke,t+1) : λt = λt+1F˜e,t+1 − ψt+1
∂
(
F3,t+1
F4,t+1
)
∂Ke,t+1
. (17)
The asymmetry in the first-order conditions arises from the equipment-skill complementarity
assumption: structure capital does not affect the wage ratio whereas equipment capital is more
complementary with skilled labor than it is with unskilled labor, i.e., ∂
(
F3,t+1
F4,t+1
)
/∂Ke,t+1 > 0.
Therefore, differential taxation of capital is optimal as long as ψt+1 6= 0. In the case with
26The assumption on the coefficient of relative risk aversion is made for analytical convenience. The results of
this section continue to apply in the case of σ ≥ 1, but the analysis becomes significantly more involved.
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a representative agent and without redistribution, we showed that the version of constraint
(15) for representative agent economy, constraint (10), is slack, and hence, it is optimal to tax
capital uniformly. We will show that constraint (15) binds when we have two agents and there
is a sufficiently strong redistribution motive. Suppose by way of contradiction that constraint
(15) does not bind. Then, the first-order optimality conditions of the Ramsey problem for
consumption and labor are:
(ci,t) : β
tu′(ci,t)(∆i + µi(1− σ)) = λt
(li,t) : β
tv′(li,t)(∆i + µi(1 + γ)) = λtwi,t.
Using the above first-order conditions together with ∆s = 0 implies:
v′(ls,t)
v′(lu,t)
u′(cu,t)
u′(cs,t)
[1/(1− σ) + µu]
[1/(1 + γ) + µu]
=
F3,t
F4,t
,
which, since γ > 0, implies that in the absence of constraint (15),
v′(ls,t)
v′(lu,t)
u′(cu,t)
u′(cs,t)
<
F3,t
F4,t
. (18)
This establishes that constraint (15) binds in the solution to the Ramsey problem, and in
particular in the direction assumed, i.e., ψt > 0.
Now we explain intuitively why constraint (15) binds in this direction. Using firm’s optimality
conditions and rearranging (18), we get
v′(ls,t)
u′(cs,t)ws,t
<
v′(lu,t)
u′(cu,t)wu,t
. (19)
Using agent’s intratemporal optimality condition in equilibrium, we can define the intratemporal
wedge for agent of type i as:
1− τ i,t = v
′(li,t)
u′(ci,t)wi,t
.
Using this definition, we can rewrite (19) as:
1− τ s,t < 1− τu,t.
Intuitively, since society cares about unskilled agents only, the government wants to redistribute
from skilled agents to unskilled agents. One way to achieve this goal is to tax skilled labor at a
higher rate than unskilled labor. This is why constraint (15) binds in the (1− τ s,t) ≥ (1− τu,t)
direction.
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Finally, (16) and (17) under ψt+1 > 0 imply it is optimal to set F˜s,t+1 < F˜e,t+1. This,
together with the non-arbitrage condition which has to hold in any equilibrium, establishes that
it is optimal to tax equipments at a higher rate than structures, i.e., τ e,t+1 > τ s,t+1 for all t ≥ 0.
Intuitively, the government wants to tax skilled labor at a higher rate than unskilled labor due
to redistributive concerns. However, this is not allowed by the labor tax code. Therefore, the
government taxes equipment capital at a higher rate, thereby indirectly achieving a higher tax
rate on the labor that is more complementary with equipment capital, skilled labor.27
This example highlights the redistributive role of differential taxation of capital when labor
income taxes cannot depend on people’s skill types.28 In particular, taxing equipments at a
higher rate helps to redistribute from skilled to unskilled people. This implies that the uniform
capital tax reform that we consider in this paper - one that starts from a status quo where
equipments are taxed at a lower rate - might improve equality. That is indeed what we find in
all our quantitative exercises.
6 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the aggregate and distributional consequences of a reform that eliminates
capital tax differentials. We find that such a reform leads to improvements in productive effi-
ciency. We also find that by decreasing the skill premium, the reform increases the degree of
equality in the economy. This implies that the reform does not suffer from the usual efficiency
vs. equality trade-off. As result of the reform, skilled agents’ steady-state welfare decreases by
0.01%, while unskilled agents’ welfare increases substantially by 0.15%, resulting in aggregate
welfare gains of approximately 0.1%.
27It is straightforward to prove that ψt < 0 and constraint (15) binds in the opposite direction when ∆s = 1,
which implies it is optimal to set τs,t > τe,t. That is, a government that wants to redistribute from unskilled to
skilled agents finds it optimal to tax structures at a higher rate than equipments.
28We prove a related result in Slav´ık and Yazici (2014) for a dynamic Mirrleesian environment with labor
productivity shocks, in which the government is able to choose a tax schedule which is arbitrarily non-linear in
agents’ labor earnings, but cannot depend on agents’ types directly.
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Appendix
A Definition of Competitive Equilibrium
First, denote the partial history of productivity shocks up to period t by zt ≡ (z0, ..., zt). Also,
denote the unconditional probability of zt for agent of skill type i by Pi,t(z
t). For each agent
type, this unconditional probability is achieved by applying the transition probability matrix
Πi(z
′|z) recursively. We denote by Zti the set in which zt lies for an agent of type i.
Equilibrium. A competitive equilibrium consists of a policy (τ c,t, Tt(·), τ s,t, τ e,t, Dt, Gt)∞t=0,
an allocation ((ci,t(z
t), li,t(z
t), ai,t+1(z
t))zt∈Zti ,i, Ks,t, Ke,t, Ls,t, Lu,t)
∞
t=0, and a price system
(rs,t, re,t, ws,t, wu,t, Rt)
∞
t=0 such that:
1. Given the policy and the price system, the allocation ((ci,t(z
t), li,t(z
t), ai,t+1(z
t)),zt)
∞
t=0
solves each consumer i′s problem, i.e.,
max
{(ci,t(zt),li,t(zt),ai,t+1(zt))zt}∞t=0
∞∑
t=0
∑
zt∈Zti
Pi,t(z
t)βtiu(ci,t(z
t))− v(li,t(zt)) s.t.
∀t ≥ 0, zt, (1 + τ c,t)ci,t(zt) + ai,t+1(zt) ≤ li,t(zt)wi,tzt − Tt(li,t(zt)wi,tzt) +Rtai,t(zt−1),
∀t ≥ 0, zt, ci,t(zt) ≥ 0, ai,t+1(zt) ≥ 0, li,t(zt) ≥ 0,
given ai0 > 0,
where Rt = [1 + (1 − τ s,t)(rs,t − δs)] = [1 + (1 − τ e,t)(re,t − δe)] is the after-tax return to
savings via holding bonds, structure capital, or equipment capital.
2. In each period t ≥ 0, taking factor prices as given, (Ks,t, Ke,t, Ls,t, Lu,t) solves the following
firm’s problem:
max
Ks,t,Ke,t,Ls,t,Lu,t
F (Ks,t, Ke,t, Ls,t, Lu,t)− rs,tKs,t − re,tKe,t − ws,tLs,t − wu,tLu,t.
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3. Markets for assets, labor, and goods clear: for all t ≥ 0,
Ks,t +Ke,t +Dt =
∑
i=u,s
pii
∑
zt−1∈Zt−1i
Pi,t−1(zt−1)ai,t(zt−1), where z−1 is the null history,
Li,t = pii
∑
zt∈Zti
Pi,t(z
t)li,t(z
t)zt for i = u, s,
Gt +
∑
i=u,s
pii
∑
zt∈Zti
Pi,t(z
t)ci,t(z
t) +Ks,t+1 +Ke,t+1 = F˜ (Ks,t, Ke,t, Ls,t, Lu,t).
4. The government’s budget constraint is satisfied every period: for all t ≥ 0,
Gt +RtDt = Dt+1 +
∑
j=s,e
τ j,t(rj,t − δj)Kj,t +
∑
i=u,s
pii
∑
zt∈Zti
Pi,t(z
t)
(
Tt(li,t(z
t)wi,tzt) + τ c,tci,t(z
t)
)
.
B Numerical Method
In this section, we outline our solution method.
General Solution Method for the Calibration Exercise. Traditionally, one would
solve for a SRCE for a fixed set of parameters, including those that will be calibrated (i.e.,
ω, ν, φ, βs, βu). This is done in the following way.
1. Start with an initial guess on prices ws, wu, R, government expenditure G and transfers T .
2. Inner loop: Solve for the policy functions given these parameters. The details of this
computation are explained below.
3. Find the stationary distributions λs, λu implied by the policy functions.
4. Compute aggregate capital and labor supplies along with output. Given these, compute
prices ws, wu, R implied by demand, government expenditure G as a fraction of output.
Compute the implied transfers T that clear government budget.
5. Check if these prices and government policies coincide with the initial guesses. If not,
update the guesses on prices, transfers and government expenditure and iterate.
One would normally solve this problem for each set of parameters during the calibration
procedure, in which we are calibrating ω, ν, φ, βs, βu to hit a selected set of targets. We found
it useful to include the calibration procedure directly into the loop above. Our procedure that
combines solving for the SRCE with the calibration procedure is as follows.
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1. Start with an initial guess on ws, wu, R,G, T, ω, ν, φ, βs, βu.
2. Repeat steps 2. - 4. from above.
3. Check if the prices and government policies coincide with the initial guesses. Check if the
aggregate labor supply, the skill premium, the labor share, the capital-to-output ratio and
the relative asset holdings match the targets (see Table 2). If not, update the guesses on
ws, wu, R,G, T, ω, ν, φ, βs, βu and iterate.
Solving the Inner Loop. Next, we briefly outline our version of the endogenous grid
method (EGM) for the incomplete markets model with endogenous labor, i.e. how we solve the
‘inner loop’ above. The policy function iteration version of the standard EGM with fixed labor
and income shocks captured by shocks to yt can be summarized as follows (we find is useful to
use time indices, although this method can be used for stationary problems as well):
1. With an initial guess on at+2 and a fixed at+1, we use the Euler equation to recover at
u′(ct) = βRt+1Et
[
u′(ct+1)
]
u′(Rtat + yt − at+1) = βRt+1Et
[
u′(Rt+1at+1 + yt+1 − at+2)
]
at =
1
Rt
{
(u′−1
(
βRt+1Et
[
u′(Rt+1at+1 + yt+1 − at+2)
])− yt + at+1}(20)
2. Once we have at(at+1, yt) we ‘invert’ it to get at+1(at, yt). We also recover ct(at, yt). Then
we go backward starting in the last period in a finite horizon problem. We iterate until
at+1 = at+2 in an ∞ problem.
Our Method with Endogeneous Labor. In our model the complication is that income
is endogeneous, because the labor choice is endogeneous, so that labor income of type i ∈ {s, u}
agent in period t is: yi,t = wi,tzt · li,t with li,t endogenous. To take care of endogenous labor
(and consumption taxes, which were not included in the discussion above), we need to take into
account the intratemporal optimality condition (dropping the index i for type for simplicity):
λ(1− τ l)(wtztlt)−τ lwtztu′(ct) = −(1 + τ c)v′(lt) (21)
Therefore the system we need to solve is:
u′(ct) = βRt+1Et [u′(ct+1)]
λ(1− τ l)(wtztlt)−τ lwtztu′(ct) = −(1 + τ c)v′(lt)
(1 + τ c)ct + at+1 = λ(wtztlt)
1−τ l +Rtat
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The intratemporal optimality condition is non-linear and thus costly to solve numerically. We
therefore solve the non-linear intratemporal optimality condition only occasionally, similarly to
the method proposed by Barillas and Fernandez-Villaverde (2007). In our model, we assume
that government debt is a given fraction of output. Transfers are included in the labor tax
function. We also need to take into account that the tax function takes mean income y¯ as an
argument. Our method can thus be summarized as follows:
1. Loop in labor policies: Fix an initial guess on policy lt(at, zt) and labor disutility
parameter φ.
2. Loop in prices and calibrating the parameters: Fix ws, wu, R,B, ω, ν, βs, βu, λ, y¯.
(a) We use yt = λ(wtztlt)
1−τ l and solve for policies ct and at+1 as if yt was exogenous using
equation (20). Observe that to use equation (20), we need to express the labor policy
as lt(at+1, zt) rather than lt(at, zt). We use lt(at, zt) and at(at+1, zt) to get lt(at+1, zt).
This approach is in fact very similar similar to the original endogeneous grid idea.
(b) We find the stationary distributions λs, λu implied by the policy functions.
(c) We then compute aggregate capital and labor supplies along with output. Observe
that while labor policies are constant in this loop, labor supply will depend on the
stationary asset distributions. Given these, we compute prices ws, wu, R implied by
demand, mean labor income y¯, government debt B and government expenditure G
as a given fraction of as a fraction of output.
(d) We then check if the prices coincide with the initial guesses. We check if the new
y¯ and B coincide with the guesses and whether the government budget balances
(given that G is a given fraction of output). We check if the aggregate labor sup-
ply, the skill premium, the labor share, the capital-to-output ratio and the relative
asset holdings match the targets (see Table 2). If not, we update the guesses on
ws, wu, R,B, ω, ν, βs, βu, λ, y¯ and iterate.
3. Given the policy ct we find the labor policy lˆt that satisfies the intratemporal first order
condition (21). We set φ so that aggregate labor hits the target.
4. We then use αlt+(1−α)lˆt (with α ∈ (0, 1)) as a new guess for the labor policy and iterate
until convergence. While we have no theorem that guarantees convergence, we find that
the procedure performs well in our model.
Solution Method for the Reform Exercise. We use the same method as just outlined
with one difference. In Step 2., we keep B,ω, ν, βs, βu, λ, y¯ fixed and search for equilibrium
ws, wu, R, as well as for τ s = τ e that clear government budget.
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C Proof of Proposition 1
First, we prove that any competitive equilibrium has to satisfy equations (4), (9), and (10). In
any equilibrium, (4) has to be satisfied since it is the goods market equilibrium condition.
Now we prove that any equilibrium allocation has to satisfy (9). Remember that a con-
sumption, labor and asset allocation, (ct, li,t, at+1)
∞
t=0 solves the agent’s problem if and only if it
satisfies the first-order optimality conditions (5)− (7), the budget constraints and the transver-
sality condition
lim
t→∞
ptat+1 = 0.
Now, multiply each period t budget constraint of the agent with the Lagrange multiplier associ-
ated with it and sum over time. Using (7) and the transversality condition above, this expression
becomes ∞∑
t=0
pt[ct − (1− τ t)
∑
i=s,u
li,twi,t] = p0R0a0. (22)
Substituting pt out using (5) and (6), we get (9).
Finally, (10) follows from the comparison of (6) for the two types of labor.
Second, suppose that a consumption, labor, and capital allocation and period 0 capital tax
rates and return on government bond satisfy conditions (4), (9), and (10). Now, we construct
an equilibrium.
First, for all t ≥ 0, define factor prices using (8). Under these prices, capital and labor
allocations satisfy firm’s optimality conditions by construction.
Second, define the interest rate on government bonds: for all t ≥ 0,
Rt+1 =
u′(ct)
βu′(ct+1)
. (23)
The taxes on the two types of capital are defined using the arbitrage condition, equation (2),
for all t ≥ 1.
Now, define labor taxes: for all t ≥ 0,
u′ (ct)
v′ (lu,t)
=
1
(1− τ t)
1
wu,t
. (24)
Define asset holdings in any period t ≥ 1 as follows. Multiply period t budget constraint
by βtu′(ct), sum it over all periods following t, and using (23) and (24) with the transversality
condition, we get:
at =
∞∑
m=t
βτ−t+1[u′(ct)ct +
∑
i=s,u
v′(li,t)li,t]/u′(ct−1). (25)
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Under this construction of taxes and prices, the consumption, labor, and asset allocations
satisfy agent’s first-order conditions (5)−(7) and period budget constraint in every period t ≥ 0.
Thus, agent’s optimality is also satisfied.
Good’s market clearing condition is satisfied by condition (4).
Finally, define government’s bond holdings Dt in any period t ≥ 0 to satisfy the asset market
clearing condition (3).
To complete the proof, we have to verify that Dt defined as above satisfies government’s
budget every period. To see this, use (3) to plug in for at in agent’s period t budget constraint.
This gives:
ct +Ks,t+1 +Ke,t+1 +Dt+1 = (1− τ t)
∑
i=s,u
Li,twi,t +Rt(Ks,t +Ke,t +Dt).
Using the second part of (23) and rearranging, we get:
Dt+1 =
∑
i=s,u
(1− τ t)Li,twi,t +
∑
j=s,e
Kj,t[1 + (1− τ j,t)(rj,t − δj)] +RtDt − ct −Ks,t+1 −Ke,t+1,
or equivalently:
Dt+1 + τ tLi,twi,t +
∑
j=s,e
Kj,t(rj,t − δj)(1− τ j,t) = F˜ (Ks,t,Ke,t, Ls,t, Lu,t)− ct −Ks,t+1 −Ke,t+1 +RtDt,
which, using (4), proves that the government budget constraint holds with equality.
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